Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War by Kirshner, Jonathan
iPolitical Economy in Security Studies
After the Cold War
Jonathan Kirshner
Department of Government
Cornell University
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
PEACE STUDIES PROGRAM
OCCASIONAL PAPER #20
©April 1997
ii
© 1997 Cornell University Peace Studies Program.  All rights reserved.
ISSN 1075-4857
Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War
Jonathan Kirshner
The Peace Studies Program was established at Cornell in 1970 as an interdisciplinary program
concerned with problems of peace and war, arms control and disarmament, and more generally,
instances of collective violence. Its broad objectives are to support graduate and post-doctoral
study, research, teaching and cross-campus interactions in these fields.
Copies of Occasional Papers may be ordered from:
Peace Studies Program
130 Uris Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY  14853-7601
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of California at Berkeley, as well
as at Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, and Princeton Universities.  Of the many who provided help-
ful comments and advice, I especially thank Rawi Abdelal, Peter Andreas, Tom Christensen,
Mike Desch, Matt Evangelista, Aaron Friedberg, Peter Katzenstein, Beth Kier, Karl Mueller,
Judith Reppy, Alan Rousso, and Barry Strauss.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
CLASSICAL ISSUES: THE UNDERLYING HARMONY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Political Economy of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Economic Causes of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Strategy and the Budget Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
MODERN ISSUES: ACTION AND REACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Coercion and Punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Influence and Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
NEW CLASSICAL ISSUES: THE ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY OF SECURITY . . . . . . 19
The Economics of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
The Locus of Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Social Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1 See, for example, Gunnar Adler-Karlson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-67 (Stockholm:
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968); Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Pol-
itics of East-West Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce W. Jentleson, Pipeline
Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1986).
2 Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 48 (August 1966), pp. 266-79; Lincoln Gordon, “Economic Aspects of
Coalition Diplomacy—The NATO Experience,” International Organization 10:3 (August 1956),
pp. 529-43.  Recent reviews of these issues include John R. Oneal, “The Theory of Collective
Action and Burden Sharing in NATO,” International Organization 44:3 (Summer 1990), pp.
379-402; and John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, “The Theory of Collective Action and NATO
Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests,” Political Research Quarterly 47:2 (June 1994), pp.
373-96.
3 According to Robert Keohane, “it is justifiable to focus principally on the political economy of
the advanced industrialized countries without continually taking into account the politics of in-
ternational security.”  After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Econ-
omy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 137.  Security specialists have reached
complementary conclusions, following Waltz’s dictum that “Never in modern history have great
powers been so sharply set off from lesser states and so little involved in each other’s economic
1
POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SECURITY STUDIES AFTER THE COLD WAR
In contemporary International Relations theory, there exists a sharp distinction between
international political economy and security studies.  This is largely a false distinction, however,
a product of peculiar circumstances associated with the cold war, and one which is becoming in-
creasingly anachronistic in the post-cold war era.  In order to understand international relations
in this era, a re-integration of the discipline is necessary.
During the cold war, there was a certain logic to the separation of political economy and
security studies.  The bipolar struggle dominated the security agenda.  That conflict featured two
states with little economic interaction—indeed, the Soviet Union did not even have a market
economy.  Thus, specialists in security affairs could comfortably marginalize economic relations,
with some notable exceptions, such as the study of “economic containment.”1  Similarly, the pos-
sibility of military conflicts among the advanced market economies seemed equally irrelevant in
the context of the clearly drawn and stable battle lines of the cold war.  Again, with specialized
exceptions, such as burden sharing,2 students of political economy were able to minimize their
concern for security.3
2and social affairs.”  Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 151-
52.
4 Joanne Gowa, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade,” American Political Science Review,
83:4 (December 1989), pp. 1245-56.
5 This is not intended to dismiss the importance of “new security issues,” or the expanded role
that political economy will likely play there.  Rather, the focus of this paper on “traditional”
security issues—defined here as war fighting capability, territorial integrity, and the projection
of power and influence abroad—underscores the argument that political economy and security
studies must be re-integrated, even if we were to retain the most narrow definition of security. 
On defining security, see Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8:1
(Summer 1983), pp. 129-53; also Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Inter-
national Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Rienner, 1991).
The cold war was also unique in that it featured actors—superpowers—who were much
less sensitive to many of the issues that smaller but still great powers had to address throughout
history, especially those associated with the political economy of national security.  Super-
powers, for example, did not face the budget constraints that states like Britain, France and Ger-
many faced routinely and consequentially in the first half of this century.  For most states, grand
strategy involves making choices about interests in the context of scarcity.  Similarly, due to
their sheer size, dominance, and relatively small exposure to the international economy, the
superpowers were less concerned about the consequences of economic interactions for pre-
serving their autonomy, or calculating the distribution of relative gains, especially given the
static alliance patterns of the era.4
Thus during the cold war, the nature of that conflict understandably but unnaturally bifur-
cated the discipline of IR into the distinct spheres of IPE and Security Studies.  But these extra-
ordinary and unprecedented circumstances are unlikely to be replicated in the foreseeable future. 
In order to understand contemporary international politics, IR theory needs to “return to normal.” 
This paper is designed to explore the relationship between the two subfields, specifically with
regard to how traditional security concerns are affected by issues normally associated with politi-
cal economy.5  It reviews three sets of issues, tracing the evolution of these questions over time. 
First is a review of “classical” concerns, which also serves as a reminder of the essential inte-
gration of IR theory throughout history.  This is followed by a consideration of modern issues,
which arose as a consequence of the emergence of a truly international economy and were devel-
36 Jacob Viner, “Power vs. Plenty as Objectives of Statecraft in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries,” World Politics 1:1 (October 1948), pp. 1-29.
7 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co.,
1856), p. 208.  Nor have liberals been blind to concerns for power.  Adam Smith supported
bounties for crucial defense industries—gunpowder and sail cloth—and supported the highly
protectionist navigation acts in order to promote British shipbuilding.  The Wealth of Nations
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976 [1776]), volume I, pp. 484-85; volume II, p. 28. 
Representative of mercantilist thought is Thomas Mun, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade
(New York: Macmillan, 1895 [1664]).
oped theoretically after the second world war.  The third section focuses on new issues, which
reflect the current manifestation of traditional concerns.  A final section applies the conclusions
of the theoretical parts of the paper to specific themes in the emerging international system.
CLASSICAL ISSUES: THE UNDERLYING HARMONY
Classical issues are those where the link between political economy and security studies
is obvious and long recognized.  They include the political economy of power, the economic
causes of war, and the role of the national budget constraint on the construction and execution of
grand strategy.  In all three cases, it is impossible to conceptualize security without an explicit
appeal to political economy.  This synthesis has a two hundred year old tradition, traceable to the
rise of liberal economic thinking and its influence on the perception of power.
The Political Economy of Power
As Viner has argued, while the mercantilists and the liberals may have disagreed on a
number of issues, both schools of thought perceived an underlying long run harmony between
the national pursuit of wealth and power.6  The liberal revolution in this regard was to change
fundamentally the understanding of what wealth was.  Traditional mercantilists stressed the
accumulation of treasure—spending power that could buy weapons and support armies.  Liberals
argued that wealth was represented not by bullion but by productive capacity.  On this point, the
neo-mercantilist descendants of the discredited mercantilists embraced the liberals’ logic.  As
Friedrich List argued, “The power of creating wealth is vastly more important than wealth it-
self.”7  Since that time, few have disputed that productive capacity is the base upon which mili-
tary power rests.  Paul Kennedy has argued, for example, that the course and outcome of the
48 Paul Kennedy, “The First World War and the International Power System,” International Secu-
rity 9:1 (1984), pp. 7-40.  Clearly, for underlying economic power to affect the outcome of a spe-
cific war, the war must be of sufficient duration.  This does not alter the basic point regarding the
essential importance of productive capacity for national power.
9 Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New
York: Basic Books, 1975); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power
and Peace (5th ed., rev.) (New York: Knopf, 1978), especially p. 126; Susan Strange, States and
Markets (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Kennedy, “First World War.”
10 Karen Rasler and William Thompson, “Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle,”
World Politics 35:4 (July 1983), pp. 489-516; also Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), especially pp. 328-36.
11 On the importance of economic growth, see especially Robert Gilpin, War and Change in
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); also Paul Kennedy, The Rise
and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Ashfield Press, 1976).
12 This is why Krasner argues it is difficult to separate realist from structural Marxist interpreta-
tions of foreign policy.  Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978), pp. 20-34.  See also Viner, “Power versus Plenty,” p. 10; Robert A.
Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1985); Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Com-
mitment to Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
First World War can be explained almost solely by evaluating the underlying economic capacity
of the participants.8
Once productive capacity is recognized as the foundation of military power, a number of
concerns are immediately brought to the fore.  In order to fight wars, states may need to be con-
cerned with their industrial capacity, steel production, access to energy (especially oil), techno-
logical capability, and other factors required to support a modern defense establishment.9  Access
to finance has also been argued to be a crucial element of national security.10  Ultimately, with
military power and influence deriving from economic power, economic stability and growth in
general becomes a central national security concern.11  This is particularly true in the long run—
in the short run various decisions may be made for the sake of security which do not maximize
wealth.  But the underlying harmony is clear, and runs so deep that in practice it is difficult to
disentangle the political and economic objectives of states in international relations.12
513 Representative of Manchester views is Richard Cobden, in a speech delivered in Manchester
January 27, 1848, in his Speeches on Questions of Public Policy (New York: Klaus Reprint Co.,
1970), pp. 233-41.  Similar views were held by U.S. policy makers after the Second World War,
who held that the closed international economy had contributed to the war.  Highly critical of
this argument are Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939, 2nd ed. (New York:
Harper, 1946), and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973).
14 Access to markets has been a staple of the radical literature, including V.I. Lenin, Imperialism:
The Highest State of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1985 [1917]); Thomas E.
Weisskopf, “Capitalism, Socialism, and the Sources of Imperialism,” in Testing Theories of Eco-
nomic Imperialism, Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, eds. (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1974); and Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy,
1945-1980 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).  Economic roots conflict have been stressed by
other writers, such as Lionel Robbins, The Economic Causes of War (London: Jonathan Cape,
1939); and Michael Howard, War In European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
Securing energy supplies has been a particular focus of attention: see, for example, Charles Kup-
chan, The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987);
and David S. Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil
Policy, 1941-1954 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).  On raw materials in
general, see Ronnie D. Lipschutz, When Nations Clash: Raw Materials, Ideology, and Foreign
Policy (Ballinger, 1989); and Raymond Vernon, Two Hungry Giants: The United States and
Japan in the Quest for Oil and Ores (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
15 Gilpin, War and Change, p. 67; John Stopford and Susan Strange with John S. Henley, Rival
States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), p. 204; see also pp. 209-11.
The Economic Causes of War
Another subject obviously at the intersection of political economy and security studies,
which can also trace its intellectual roots back well over one hundred years, is the economic
causes of war.  Manchester School economists in the nineteenth century, for example, saw a neg-
ative relationship between free trade and war.13  Others see conflict emerging from inter-state
competition over access to markets and raw materials.14  More generally, Gilpin states that “in a
world of scarcity the fundamental issue is the distribution of the available economic surplus,”
while Susan Strange sees the post-cold war era as one characterized by states “more directly
engaged in the competition for shares of the world’s wealth.”15
In practice, there are three principal ways in which economic forces act as a source of
war: changes in relative economic growth, internal economic dislocation, and incompatible
616 Wars can also be fought simply to reap the gains of conquest.  See Peter Liberman, Does Con-
quest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995).  While the potential of such gains affects the cost-benefit calculus of going to war,
it is only in a secondary sense that such incentives can be characterized an “economic force” that
acts as “a source of war.”  Arguments regarding imperialism, market access and raw materials
(see fn. 14) derive conflict and war from economic imperatives found within the expansionist
state, and fall more obviously into the class of issues at interest here.
17 Satisfied does not mean “happy,” rather, simply that no state is willing to use force to change
the status quo.
18 Robert Gilpin, War and Change; George Liska, International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Es-
say on the Politics and Organization of Security (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957);
also his “Continuity and Change in International Systems,” World Politics 16:1 (October 1963);
A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (2nd ed.) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), especially pp.
364-67; A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1980); Charles F. Doran, “War and Power Dynamics: Economic Underpinnings,” Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, 27:4 (December 1983), pp. 419-40; and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of
the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Ashfield Press, 1980), especially pp. 291-
360.
national economic strategies.16  Changes in relative economic growth are argued to contribute to
war by scholars who emphasize the importance of equilibrium between power and privilege in
the international system.  Under such conditions, states are satisfied with the status quo.17 
According to this school of thought, because states tend to grow at differential rates, there is a
natural impetus for the international system to drift away from equilibrium.  Since power derives
from underlying economic capacity, states that are growing faster perceive a divergence between
their power and position in the international pecking order.  Such states force a confrontation to
revise the status quo, and this is often resolved by war.18
Internal economic dislocation can contribute to conflict for a number of reasons deriving
primarily from the pressures that governments can find themselves under as a consequence of
hard times.  Such governments may resort to “military Keynesianism,” that is, efforts at pump
priming by expanded military spending.  These measures can contribute to war by heightening
the security dilemma, creating a militaristic mind-set, or by the purposeful extension of military
Keynesian tactics.  Hard times can also increase the perceived stakes in struggles for interna-
tional economic opportunity.  States may also engage in military adventures to divert attention
away from failed domestic policies, or such dislocation may radicalize politics in general.  The
719 Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims (New York: Norton, 1973), especially pp. 17-27; Arthur van
Riel and Arthur Schram, “Weimar Economic Decline, Nazi Economic Recovery, and the Stabili-
zation of Political Dictatorship,” Journal of Economic History 53:1 (March 1993) pp. 71-105. 
On “hard times,” Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion
1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963).  On domestic diversion, David Pion-Berlin,
“The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976-1983,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and
World Affairs 27:2 (Summer 1985), pp. 55-76.  See also Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and
Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963);
and Jack Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Handbook of War Studies,
Manus Midlarsky, ed. (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
20 Viner, “Power versus Plenty,” p. 29; Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The
Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Paul M.
Kennedy, “Why did the British Empire Last So Long,” in his Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-
1945: Eight Studies (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 197-218.
21 Paul Einzig, Behind the Scenes of International Finance (London: Macmillan, 1932), p. 145.
interwar depression, for example, is often cited as contributing to the rise of Nazism in Germany
and more broadly to the second world war.19
Conflicts can also be initiated or exacerbated by incompatible national strategies. 
Japan’s inter-war grand strategy, for example, could not help but cause confrontation with the
United States and Britain.  Often such strategies unintentionally drive conflict as a consequence
of the unintended effects of economic policies.  Viner has argued, for example, that mercantilist
strategies “served to poison international relations.”  Contrapositively, there is Kennedy’s argu-
ment that one of the reasons why the British empire lasted so long was because its liberal inter-
national management ruffled few feathers.20  Additionally, economic strategies may not only be
incompatible, they may backfire.  French financial diplomacy in the inter-war period intended to
influence German policy, for example, may instead have contributed to the deterioration of the
situation. As Paul Einzig presciently argued in 1931, France’s policy was short-sighted and
invited self-defeating international financial chaos.  He added “a collapse of the reichsmark is
certain to bring about a complete political upheaval in Germany.  It is highly probable that either
the extreme nationalists or the communists will then acquire power.  In either case, the French
political influence over Germany would cease.”21
822 Douglas B. Ball, Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1991); Richard Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in
America, 1859-1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Robert Ferris, Men,
Money, and Diplomacy: The Evaluation of British Strategic Policy, 1919-1926 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989); Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The
Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1976); René Girault, “The Impact of the Economic Situation on the Foreign Pol-
icy of France, 1936-9,” in The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, Wolfgang J.
Strategy and the Budget Constraint
The incompatibility of national economic strategies calls attention to the issue of grand
strategies in general.  Avoiding unintended (and self-defeating) provocation is a necessary com-
ponent of strategy, but it is not sufficient.  Two central questions remain: how to form an optimal
grand strategy, an exercise in setting priorities and reconciling ends and means; and what con-
straints are imposed on crisis and wartime operations by limited resources.  These are issues at
the heart of security studies—and they are also fundamentally questions of political economy.  In
fact it is notable that two concerns we have identified as central: economic growth and grand
strategy, are the two principal questions on which the entire field of economics is based: (a) the
causes of economic growth (the full title of Smith’s book is An Inquiry Into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations), and (b) efficient allocation and distribution given scarcity (the
essential microeconomic question).
To reiterate, the construction of grand strategy is a fundamentally economic question;
further, a state’s budget constraint defines the limits of its power.  Understanding or failing to
recognize these limits often makes the difference between successful and unsuccessful foreign
policy.  In the context of a crisis or war, retaining international solvency (particularly with regard
to the balance of payments), mobilizing and extracting resources from society, and maintaining
domestic economic stability are all crucial for success.  These issues are ubiquitous and have
been highly consequential.  Financial problems plagued the Confederacy during the American
Civil War, while during the Suez crisis, Britain was forced to renounce its operation in order to
relieve pressure on the pound.  Russia was unable to adequately harness its economy before and
during the First World War.  France was plagued by economic weakness during the Ruhr crisis
and financial constraints contributed to British and French appeasement policies leading up to
the second world war.22
9Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker, eds. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983); Robert Frank-
enstein, “The Decline of France and French Appeasement Policies,” in Mommsen and Ketten-
aker; Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1991); Peter Gatrell, Government, Industry, and Rearmament in Russia
1900-1914: The Last Argument of Tsarism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
23 It should be noted that this relationship runs both ways: war affects state power and capacity. 
On this question, see John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State,
1688-1783 (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1989); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European
States, A.D. 990-1990 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990); “War Making and State Making as
Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and
Theda Skocpol, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Michael C. Desch, “War
and Strong States, Peace and Weak States?” International Organization 50:2 (Spring 1996), pp.
237-68.
Clearly, there exists a rich tradition of integration between issues associated with political
economy and security studies, which is essential to understanding state power as well as the
causes and courses of conflict and war.23  The intellectual history of these issues can be traced 
to the 19th century and before, and the intimate association between the two was commonly
assumed and understood prior to the cold war.
MODERN ISSUES: ACTION AND REACTION
Modern issues emerge from the consequences of linkages between political economy and
security in the context of a well-developed international economy.  The tugging and hauling of
international economic influences—exposure to the international economy—and states’ efforts
to balance their desires for increased wealth and maximal security, create a distinct class of con-
cerns for states.  The increasing size of the international economy dating from the last quarter of
the nineteenth century presented states with new sets of problems in the first half of the twen-
tieth, and these concepts were developed theoretically in the second half of this century.  The
larger the state, however, the less intensely these issues are felt.  As a result, they were least
salient to the extraordinary superpowers, and not typically considered “high security issues”
during the Cold War.  With the end of the Cold War, the continuing expansion of the interna-
tional economy, and the increasing number of states in the system, these issues will be of
increasing consequence in the coming years.  In this era, there will be more small states, and,
more importantly, all states will be more like small states than they were in the past.
10
24 On sanctions, see David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions
Reconsidered: Volume 1: History and Current Policy.  Volume 2: Supplemental Case Histories,
2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990); Klaus Knorr, Power of
Nations; David Leyton-Brown, ed., The Utility of International Economic Sanctions (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1987); Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Harvard Studies in
International Affairs No. 45, 1981); Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contempo-
rary Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987) and Economic Sanctions and Interna-
tional Enforcement , 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); M.S. Daoudi and M.S.
Dajani, Economic Sanctions, Ideals and Experience (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983);
William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, International Economic Sanctions: A Public
Choice Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).
Coercion and Punishment
Efforts at economic coercion and punishment, or economic sanctions, have a bad reputa-
tion in the public perception and among scholars.  Conventional wisdom holds that economic
sanctions “don’t work.”  This wisdom is flawed, however, and furthermore, economic diplomacy
will play an increasingly large role in international relations.  With the glue of the Soviet threat
no longer in place, conflicts among the western allies will increase and be less constrained.
These disputes will almost certainly be fought with economic as opposed to military techniques
of statecraft.  The collapse of communism has also increased the number of small, market-
sensitive economies in the international system, which are particularly vulnerable to economic
coercion.  Additionally, several great powers, in particular the United States, Germany, and
Japan, retain global interests but appear disinclined to use force to resolve most conflicts.  For all
these reasons students of security studies will need a greater understanding of economic
statecraft.
Despite some notable advances in the past decade, particularly David Baldwin’s Eco-
nomic Statecraft, and also Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot’s Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, our
understanding of economic sanctions remains limited.24  The consensus regarding their limited
utility has left them under-studied.  But the belief that economic sanctions “don’t work” is based
on a number of errors, which are considered at length in Baldwin.  In particular, (1) the failure to
consider why economic sanctions were enacted; (2) the failure to compare costs; and (3) the fail-
ure to consider context, lead to analyses that understate the relative utility of sanctions.
11
25 On signaling and boat-rocking, see Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960), and Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966).
(1) Economic sanctions, designed to punish a state and change its behavior, are also
enacted for additional reasons.  One important one is signaling: sanctions can signal to friends
and foes alike that you are opposed to an action and will take steps to counter it.  It can provide
moral support to opposition groups within the target, serve as a warning to others contemplating
similar actions, and provide a boat-rocking function—warning that more extreme behavior may
result in increasingly dramatic actions.25  So correctly assessing success or failure depends
greatly on the entire range of outcomes the policy was designed to bring about.
(2) In arguing that economic sanctions “don’t work,” there is often an implicit compari-
son to other techniques of statecraft such as military force.  But this comparison is almost always
left undeveloped.  Does military force “work”?  This is an odd question, but a fundamental one. 
Clearly, force often fails.  More importantly, success in statecraft is measured in political out-
comes.  As such, the costs—both political and economic—of a given technique of statecraft must
be weighed against the political benefits of success.  There may be many instances where mili-
tary force would be unsuccessful and even more cases where the various costs of using force
would be greater than the benefits of success.  In those cases, force won’t “work.”  Ultimately, it
is unproductive to argue whether in the abstract, economic (or military statecraft) “doesn’t
work.”  Emphasis should be refocused to elucidate when different tactics will provide states with
optimal policies, considering the various costs and benefits associated with different choices.  No
strategy can guarantee success: all one can hope to do is enact the “optimal” policy.
(3) Finally, it should be noted that it is impossible to evaluate the absolute power of a
specific sanction (just as it is impossible to do so for a specific military action).  Prospects for
success depend on how much the adversary is willing to sacrifice, and this will be different from
case to case, depending both on the value the target places on non-compliance and on the objec-
tive of the sanction.  It is simply impossible to say whether a trade embargo that reduces GNP by
10% will “work” or not.  Most likely, there will be cases when it will work and cases when it
won’t.
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26 I have argued elsewhere that a greater understanding of economic sanctions can be achieved
with a “microfoundations” approach to economic sanctions, which disaggregates both the sanc-
tions and targets.  Only by better understanding the distinct attributes of specific tactics, and the
diverse vulnerabilities of different domestic political structures, can sanctions be optimally em-
ployed.  See Jonathan Kirshner, “The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions” (unpublished
paper, 1995).  For an early example of this type of analysis, see Richard H. Ullman, “Human
Rights and Economic Power: The United States versus Idi Amin,” Foreign Affairs 56:3 (April
1978), p. 532.  See also David Rowe, “Surviving Economic Coercion: Rhodesia’s Responses to
International Economic Sanctions,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, Durham NC, 1993.
27 Expanded edition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980 [1945]).
Calling attention to these issues still leaves, and in fact increases, the need for additional
research on economic sanctions.  In particular two processes require further exploration: the rela-
tionship between the imposition of economic sanctions and the level of economic distress in the
target, and the relationship between that domestic distress and policy change.  These themes are
derived from the folk wisdom regarding sanctions.  When the sentiment is expressed that sanc-
tions don’t “work,” this usually means one of two things: either the sanctions are unable to cause
economic distress, or that distress is insufficient to change policy.  Sanctions against Rhodesia,
Nicaragua, and South Africa, for example were often said to have been unsuccessful because
they were circumvented by networks of black markets, dummy corporations and other states’
incentives to cheat.  Sanctions against Panama, Iraq, and Serbia, on the other hand, have been
able to cause great economic distress but that remarkable pressure did not translate into desired
policy changes.26
Influence and Dependence
More subtle than coercion is the political economy of influence and dependence.  Depen-
dence results from asymmetries in economic relationships, and from the ways in which those
asymmetries change states’ preferences.  Influence is the flip side of dependence: that which
accrues to the dominant partner in an asymmetric relationship.  The study of dependence goes
back to Albert O. Hirschman’s National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade.27  Hirsch-
man examined German interwar trading relations, demonstrating how Germany cultivated a
series of asymmetric trading relationships with the small states of south-eastern Europe, as part
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28 See also Allan G.B. Fisher, “The German Trade Drive in South-Eastern Europe,” International
Affairs 18:2 (March 1939), pp. 143-70.
29 Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York:
Basic Books, 1990), p. 188.  Nye argues that “trends today are making . . . soft power resources
more important.”  See also pp. 189-201.
30 Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98:3 (August 1983), pp. 373-400.
31 Charles P. Kindleberger, “Group Behavior and International Trade” (1951), reprinted in
Kindleberger, Economic Response: Comparative Studies in Trade, Finance, and Growth (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative
Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
of its preWorld War II grand strategy.28  Small state participants in asymmetric economic rela-
tionships are much more sensitive to them than are their larger counterparts.  Trade between
Germany and Bulgaria, to take one example from Hirschman, could account for over half of
Bulgaria’s total trade while at the same time accounting for a trivial two or three percent of total
German trade.  Clearly, Bulgaria was more vulnerable to an interruption of trade than was Ger-
many.  This offered the latter considerable leverage over the former.
But dependence is not mainly about leverage, or coercion.  It is distinct from coercion,
and similar to what Nye has called “soft power.”  Instead of forcing others to do what you want
them to do, soft power is about “getting others to want what you want.”29  Engaging in economic
relations, especially those that involve discrimination—such as trade agreements or currency
areas, alters the domestic political economy of each state.  In asymmetric settings, this shift takes
place almost entirely in the small state—its interests converge toward those of the dominant
state.  As an illustration, consider a small state reaching a free trade agreement with a large state. 
This causes convergence in three ways.  First, the simple act of participation in the arrangement
strengthens those who benefit from it relative to those who do not (by definition).  This strength
should translate into political power.30  Second, firms and sectors engage in patterns of activity
based on economic incentives.  This constellation of incentives is transformed when the state
enacts the new trade agreement.  Actors will respond to these incentives, and will form political
coalitions to advance their interests.31  Decisions based on these new incentives give firms a
stake in their nations’ continued participation, and they will direct their political energies to that
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32 Hirschman, National Power, p. 29.  On sectors, see Kindleberger, “Group Behavior”; on coali-
tions, Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times.
33 This can result from concerns regarding the overall balance of trade, revenue from tariffs, or
trade undertaken or controlled by the government.  In general, governments themselves are more
likely to be affected by monetary arrangements, such as participation in currency areas.  Here,
participation will affect the nature and capability of the government to provide monetary stabili-
ty.  Small states in monetary areas will also come to hold significant balances of the core cur-
rency, which creates an interest in the value and stability of that currency, as well as the general
political fortunes of its issuer.  See Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political
Economy of International Monetary Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), espe-
cially chapter 4.
34 Ian M. Drummond, The Floating Pound and the Sterling Area, 1931-1939 (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1981), p. 254; Robert B. Stewart, “Instruments of British Policy in the
Sterling Area,” Political Science Quarterly 52:2 (June 1937), pp. 184-191; Philip W. Bell, The
Sterling Area in the Postwar World: Internal Mechanism and Cohesion, 1946-1952 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 18.
end.  As Hirschman noted, “. . . these regions or industries will exert a powerful influence in
favor of a ‘friendly’ attitude towards the state to the imports of which they owe their interests.”32 
Third, the central government can find its own interests re-shaped, above and beyond the effects
of domestic political pressures.33
It should be made clear that fostering dependence in order to enhance influence is under-
taken by states using economic means to advance political goals.  This is distinct from depen-
dency, in which power is used to enforce economic extraction.  Small states in dependent rela-
tionships such as those described above gain economically, both absolutely and relatively: in-
deed, this is the source of the influence.  The United States bore significant costs and tolerated
discrimination to promote its post-war trade and monetary regimes.  Previously, Britain offered a
number of incentives to solidify the sterling area,34 and this was true of the franc zone as well. 
One critic of the latter arrangement argued “from the economic point of view, it is hard to argue”
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225 (emphasis in original).  See also Aguibou Y. Yansane, “Some Problems of Monetary Depen-
dency in French-Speaking West African States,” Journal of African Studies 5:4 (Winter 1978),
pp. 444-70.  International Monetary Fund (IMF), “The CFA Franc System,” IMF Staff Papers,
10:3 (November 1963), pp. 357-60, 369, 376.
36 Antonín Basch, The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1943), p. 178.
37 David Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics 24:1 (October 1971), pp.
19-38; George Liska, The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960); John D. Montgomery, Foreign Aid in International Politics
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), and also his The Politics of Foreign Aid: American
Experience in Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1962); Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of
Foreign Aid: Policies, Problems, and Possibilities (New York: Praeger, 1967).
38 Herbert Feis, Europe the World’s Banker, 1870-1914: An Account of European Foreign In-
vestment and the Connection of World Finance with Diplomacy Before the War (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1964 [1930]); Jacob Viner, “International Finance and Balance of Power
Diplomacy, 1880-1914,” Political and Social Science Quarterly 9:4 (March 1929), pp. 408-451;
Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era, 1919-1932 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965
[1950]); Emile Moreau, The Golden Franc: Memoirs of a Governor of the Bank of France
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), especially pp. 430-453.
39 See Liska, New Statecraft; Desmond McNeill, The Contradictions of Foreign Aid (London:
Croom Helm, 1981); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1987), especially p. 225.
that states were wrong in retaining membership.35  Even Germany’s eastern European trading
partners saw economic advantages from the deals they reached in the inter-war period.36
As with coercion, the mechanics of influence and dependence need to be more fully ex-
plored.  This is particularly challenging because it is difficult to measure the “success” of these
policies for large states.  Unlike efforts at coercion, which aim to alter existing behavior, this
form of statecraft, even when successful, works invisibly.  Measuring altered preferences and
their impact on policy decisions is problematic, especially given the challenge of establishing
relevant counterfactuals.  But powerful states have constantly attempted to use their economic
resources to expand their influence.  This has taken the form not only of efforts at trade and
monetary arrangements, but also the manipulation of aid37 and financial38 arrangements.
Such efforts are not always successful.  Many states have been disappointed by the
amount of influence they have been able to “purchase” for a given amount of aid.39  Manipu-
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York: Basic Books, 1971); Edwin M. Graham and Paul R. Krugman Foreign Direct Investment
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lating financial flows backfired both for Germany and France, in their efforts to influence Russia
and Italy respectively, before World War I.  But economic influence can be consequential.  More
importantly, states’ interests evolve and are shaped by their economic relationships.  This is of
particular concern in periods of transition where interests are most contestable.
Autonomy
Influence and dependence refer to inter-state relations, including efforts by states to con-
strain the range of other states’ behavior.  For example, as recipients of aid or as members in
preferential trading areas, states may refrain from engaging in certain behaviors that they expect
would be incompatible with the preferences of their benefactors.  This limits their options.
At the same time, there are more global international forces at work that challenge state
power in a distinct way—they challenge the state’s ability to function as an autonomous actor.
Questions of autonomy differ from those of influence and dependence in that autonomy, as used
here, refers to the power of the state vis-à-vis stateless forces: markets, firms, and individuals. 
These global market forces can limit and constrain policy, eroding overall national power.
There are a number of manifestations of increasing challenges to state autonomy: ex-
panding international financial networks, enormous foreign exchange markets, increasingly
complex international intra-firm trade, competition for foreign investment, and large migratory
flows.  These “market forces” present three problems for states: first, private actors may engage
in patterns of activity that can diverge from the goals of government policy, creating domestic
political barriers to some preferred policies.40  Second, and especially regarding issues of trade
and foreign investment, there is the issue of control: whether the government will have the legal
right or the practical capability to execute its chosen policies when dealing with transnational
private actors.41  Included here are concerns for defense autonomy: the perceived need to have
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42 Aaron Friedberg, “The End of Autonomy: The United States After Five Decades,” Christopher
Mark Davis, “The Exceptional Soviet Case: Defense in an Autarkic System,” Theodore Moran
and David Mowrey, “Aerospace,” and J. Nicholas Ziegler, “Semiconductors,” all in Daedalus
120:4 (Fall 1991); Raymond Vernon, Deborah Spar, and Glenn Tobin, “Designing CoDevelop-
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U.S. Foreign Economic Policymaking (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 55-80; Ethan Kapstein,
“Losing Control: National Security and the Global Economy,” The National Interest 18 (Winter
1989/90), pp. 85-90; Theodore H. Moran, “The Globalization of America’s Defense Industries:
Managing the Threat of Foreign Dependence,” International Security 15:1 (Summer 1990), pp.
57-99.  Michael Borrus and John Zysman, “Industrial Competitiveness and American National
Security,” in The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System,
Wayne Sandholtz, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 7-52.
43 These restraints are not obviously surmountable, as once unleashed, financial deregulation is
difficult to contain. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bret-
ton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), especially pp. 12, 18, 152, 156,
196-98.  See also J. Goodman and L. Pauly, “The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic
Management in an Age of Global Markets,” World Politics 46:1 (October 1993), pp. 50-82;
Andrew D. Cosh, Alan Hughes, and Ajit Singh, “Openness, Financial Innovation, Changing
Patterns of Ownership, and the Structure of Financial Markets,” in Financial Openness and
National Autonomy: Opportunities and Constraints, Tariq Banuri and Juliet B. Schor, eds.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).  For an argument that previous periods witnessed even greater
financial integration, see Robert Zevin, “Are World Financial Markets More Open? If So, Why
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such control over industries crucial for national security.42  Third, particularly in the areas of
finance, foreign exchange and foreign investment, there is the possibility that market reactions
will undercut and even force a reversal of preferred policies.  States need to be sensitive to the
possibility that their policies may lead to capital flight, touch off speculation against their cur-
rencies, or discourage foreign investment.
It is this third set of issues which appear the most challenging to state autonomy in the
contemporary international economy.  Increased financial globalization has reduced macroeco-
nomic policy autonomy, and this affects states’ ability to increase defense spending, mobilize
their military forces, or even engage in behavior that is perceived to risk war.43  Markets can be
swift and decisive in imposing their discipline, as seen recently in Mexico.  But limited macro-
economic policy autonomy is not restricted to small states, as seen most obviously in the well
known French episode of the early 1980s.  In that instance the socialist government of François
Mitterrand was forced, after repeated inability to contain capital flight and following three deval-
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44 Jeffrey Sachs and Charles Wyplosz, “The Economic Consequences of President Mitterrand,”
Economic Policy (April 1986), pp. 262-306; Michael Loriaux, France After Hegemony: Interna-
tional Change and Financial Reform (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); See also Paulette
Kurzer, Business and Banking: Political Change and Economic Integration in Western Europe
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
45 Brendan Brown, The Flight of International Capital: A Contemporary History (London: Rout-
ledge, 1987), p. 71; see also Stephen Schuker, “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland,
1936,” French Historical Studies 14:3 (Spring 1986), pp. 299-338; Frankenstein, “French
Appeasement Policies,” p. 237.  Girault argues that “Appeasement, whether committed or tem-
porizing, has its economic justification in the crying insufficiency of financial resources, caused
essentially by the flight of capital” (“Foreign Policy of France,” p. 223).
46 Even if autonomy-seeking states move to re-establish control over market forces, regionalism
or “minilateralism,” not autarky, is the likely result.  This is because security-conscious states
must be sensitive to the importance of economic growth.  Engaging the international economy
provides expanded opportunities and greater prospects for growth.  Thus such states face trade-
offs between complete autarky and unfettered internationalism in the pursuit of their multiple
goals.  Regionalism is the obvious compromise, combining relative autonomy with international
uations of the franc within eighteen months, to reverse course, abandon its expansionary macro-
economic policies, and introduce austerity measures that were more restrictive than those of its
conservative predecessor.44  In this instance, France’s national security was not at stake, nor were
defense policies at the root of the crisis.  But they easily could have been.
France’s failure to respond to the German remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, for
example, was influenced by a dramatic capital flight and speculation against the franc.  The Ger-
man action took place on Saturday March 7, and on the following Monday, selling pressure on
the franc was sufficiently severe to bring about British intervention in the market.  French hints
that they might use force to remove the Germans were followed by a jump in the three month
discount on the franc from eight to fourteen percent per annum.  Shortly thereafter the French
made it clear that they would not use force, and the pressure on the franc eased.45
State autonomy is increasingly challenged from many quarters, restricting policy options. 
In this issue area all states are becoming small states.  While these forces can result in a number
of different patterns of international relations, growing economic influences on security are
inescapable.  If states react to the expanding global market forces with a re-assertion of their
autonomy, then the likely regionalization of the international economy will increase the signifi-
cance of influence and dependence.46  If the market is left unchecked, then restrictions on policy
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economic opportunity.  This result is predicted by scholars such as Gilpin, who states that “a
mixed system of nationalism, regionalism, and sectoral protectionism is replacing the Bretton
Woods system of multilateral liberalization.”  Because of these pressures, he concludes, “loose
regional blocs are the likely result.”  Gilpin, Political Economy of International Relations, pp.
395 (first quote), 397 (second quote).
47 See for example, Richard Cohen and Peter A. Wilson, Superpowers in Economic Decline: U.S.
Strategy for the Transcentury Era (New York: Crane Russak, 1990), especially pp. 30-33.
autonomy will become more routine, consequential, and of necessity integrated into strategic
planning.
NEW CLASSICAL ISSUES: THE ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY OF SECURITY
All states in coming years will find their security positions increasingly influenced by
political economy.  This will not be limited to the rise of modern issues—classical issues will
also resurface in the post-cold war era, though in some cases, they will take distinct forms, and
can be considered “new classical issues.”  New classical issues focus on the classical concern for
economic growth as essential to power.  In contemporary politics, this takes a number of forms
which all focus around the issue of the economic sustainability of security.  Ultimately, the
Soviet Union fell not because of military weakness, but because of fundamental flaws in its
political economy: its impressive military security system was not sustainable.  Its defense bur-
den became onerous, it fell further behind technologically, and was unable to produce economic
growth.  One sure lesson of the Cold War is that states cannot afford to ignore the importance of
these factors.
The Economics of Defense
One way in which the issue of the economic sustainability of security surfaces is through
the possibility that the myopic pursuit of military might erodes the economic base of the state. 
This became a popular item of concern during the Cold War.  The Soviet Union was over-
whelmed by its staggering defense burden,47 and there was concern that the U.S. military build-
up might also undermine the U.S. economy.  These concerns were popularized by Paul Kennedy
in his book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, which held that such powers were histori-
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cally done in by military burdens bloated by strategic overextension.48  This argument had been
stated theoretically by Gilpin, who argued that pressure for increased defense spending in mature
hegemons was one factor that contributed to decreasing investment and thus slower economic
growth.49  The high military burden of the United States, especially when compared to the spend-
ing of prosperous American allies such as Japan, was often cited as source of economic distress
and poor economic performance.  Posen and Van Evera Argued that “wasteful military spending
is itself a national security threat, because it contributes to America’s economic decline.”50  Mili-
tary spending is held to divert resources from the civilian sector, crowd out private investment,
and pre-empt more productive forms of government spending.51
One comprehensive survey of the issue found that while it can provide a short term stim-
ulus, in the long run military spending tends to have negative economic consequences.52  But this
remains a hotly debated question, and the consequence of this conclusion, which is not univer-
sally accepted, is unclear.  How much spending is “too much”?  How detrimental is it?  These
questions are certainly raised by the U.S. case, where the dramatic increases in military spending
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in the first half of the 1980s left a burden that was still lower as a percentage of gross national
product than it had been in the 1950s and 60s.  Further, the problems facing the U.S. economy
were more likely the result of other factors, such as over-consumption, reflected in the fiscal and
trade “twin deficits,” which have macroeconomic consequences that dwarf those related to its
defense spending.  Finally, U.S. economic performance was superior to that of most of its allies
in the 1980s.53  More generally, the exact trade-offs between defense spending and economic
performance are hard to pin down.  The effect of military spending, difficult to measure and
compare across states, is also influenced by factors such as a state’s level of development and its
position in the business cycle.54
The relationship between defense spending and economic performance remains a com-
plex and contested issue.55  But the ultimate outcome of this debate does not change the fact that
the provision of defense will affect the domestic economy, which in turn shapes the
sustainability of state security, and that there remains a need for students of security to
understand these relationships.
The Locus of Production
New classical issues emphasize the crucial role of economic growth in sustaining
national security.  Nowhere is this clearer than in the concern for the locus of production: what is
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56 This need not be the justification for government intervention for other reasons, such as to pre-
serve defense autonomy.  In that case, economic growth is purposefully sacrificed to advance
non-economic goals.  Here, however, the concern is solely with long run economic growth, and
thus intervention cannot be justified without the demonstration of market failure.
57 See, for example George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’,” Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 84:3 (August 1970), pp. 488-500.  For a brief summary of the theory of market failure as it
pertains to international trade, see Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Eco-
nomics: Theory and Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 232-6.
58 Strategic behavior by both governments and firms is emphasized by Henri Hauser, Germany’s
Commercial Grip on the World: Her Business Methods Explained (London: Eveleigh Nash,
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on the Subject of Manufactures,” in Industrial and Commercial Correspondence of Alexander
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For the contemporary positions, see James A. Brander, “Rationales for Strategic Trade
produced where.  This concerns the national interest because the composition of production can
affect growth, because certain industries either have inherently superior growth trajectories, or
they provide positive externalities to the greater economy.
The central question is whether government intervention is necessary to support such in-
dustries.  This rests crucially on the concept of market failure: that the free market, left to its own
devices, would produce sub-optimal economic outcomes.56  Market failures certainly exist,57 but
it is necessary to identify them specifically in each case and explain how they can be eliminated
by government intervention.  For example, if industries offer high growth, why do private actors
need any encouragement to invest in them?  There are a number of possibilities: private actors
may have shorter time horizons, greater risk aversion, or fewer resources than the government. 
Projects that do not offer returns for many years, or have a high probability of failure, or have
great start-up costs may be underprovided by the private sector.  In industries with economies of
scale and other advantages to being the first producer, firms may be further inhibited from entry
into otherwise promising ventures.  This is complicated by “strategic” behavior—foreign gov-
ernments (and firms themselves) engaging in measures designed to inhibit entry by others.  Such
action, it is often argued, can only be countered by competing government intervention. These
arguments are not unique to the current era but they are increasingly salient in a world of activist
governments and high technology industries.58
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Some grounds for government intervention appear to be even more straightforward. 
There is a rich Pigovian tradition regarding externalities—those outputs from production not
counted in firms’ cost calculation.  The existence of externalities means that there can be a diver-
gence between private and societal levels of optimal production.  This leads to an overproduction
of negative externalities, such as pollution, or an underprovision of positive externalities, such as
technologies with spin-off applications.  As a result, the government should introduce taxes and
subsidies to manipulate the production of externalities so that the private and societal optima are
equated.59
But even this minimal and compelling logic for intervention has been challenged.  Coase
has argued that size and scope for Pigovian taxes is much smaller than is usually acknowledged. 
And even this assumes that externalities can be identified and corrected.60  The problems mount
even further in practice.  Even if optimal policies could be calculated, would they be introduced? 
Critics suggest that “government failure” could lead to greater costs than market failure, and that
industrial policies could lead to wasteful rent-seeking, crude protectionism, and invite foreign
retaliation.61  Finally, there remains the danger that despite avoiding all of the pitfalls mentioned
above, the government may still err.  In the case of high-definition-television, for example, once
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a rallying point for proponents of activism, U.S. producers currently have the advantage because
subsidized European and Japanese competitors committed to the wrong technology.62
An additional danger regarding strategies designed to affect the locus of production is
that they may oversell the importance of trade strategy’s contribution to the national economy.63
Tyson herself notes that “misguided trade policies can be even worse than ineffective,” and that
“flawed domestic choices, not unfair foreign trading practices, are main cause of the nation’s
long-run economic slowdown.”64
The Social Economy
Whatever the merits of strategic trade and industrial policy, they do not appear to be of
sufficiently great or unambiguous weight to place them within the first rank of new classical
security concerns in the contemporary system.  But they do call attention to the importance of
the management of the domestic economy.  While controversy persists regarding the locus of
production, there is increasing consensus that government policies which “get the basics right”
are an important element of economic growth.  Instead of targeting sectors, such policies
emphasize the economic foundations of society, such as education, infrastructure, incentives for
savings and investment, and sound macroeconomic policies.65
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The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990); World Bank, The East
Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993).
66 Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981).
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These concerns underscore a more fundamental issue for the sustainability of security—
the question of national vitality.  Starting with “the basics” rooted in new growth theory, this
also includes issues associated with the sociological foundation of long run economic growth. 
The incentive structure assures that actors will be encouraged to engage in activities that pro-
mote economic growth.  Just as the absence of government intervention can lead to a divergence
of private and social optima, excessive government regulation and taxation can have the same
effect.  Clear property rights and predictable legal structures also contribute to a convergence
between private and social interests.66  At the same time, government intervention is crucial in a
number of areas, particularly with regard to the provision of public goods, such as a sound infra-
structure.  Economic activity depends on efficient transportation networks, and this includes not
only roads, bridges, rails, canals, and airports, but also the transmission of information.  Further,
these assets will not be fully utilized without sufficient investment in human capital, which is
increasingly recognized as a fundamental source of economic growth.67
The economic sustainability of security is also sensitive to social cohesion.  The erosion
of national vitality, either from internal weakness or domestic conflict, affects not only future
economic growth, but also the very ability of states to pursue grand strategies that may require
short term sacrifices for long run benefits.  In Gilpin’s model of hegemonic decline, such factors
as the corrupting influence of affluence and other social factors figure prominently.  Many argue
that British decline—especially the failure to adapt to the technologies of the second industrial
revolution—was hastened by sociological factors including a sclerotic and stratified class struc-
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ture.68  Others, such as Olson, have emphasized the role of domestic distributional conflict in
inhibiting economic growth—again, such conflict can also paralyze national strategy by reducing
the central government’s ability to mobilize domestic resources for foreign policy.69
One dimension of social cohesion is income distribution, which is an important new clas-
sical security issue that affects both current and future state power.  With regard to current capa-
bilities, sustained or increasing inequality may contribute to insurrection or rebellion (fundamen-
tally reducing state power).70  But as emphasized above, even in the absence of these outcomes,
increasing inequality and social conflict will restrict the state’s capability to pursue optimal for-
eign policies due to the hyper-politicization of fiscal policy.  Concerning future power,
inequality may reduce economic growth.  While it was traditionally assumed that a widening and
narrowing of inequality was natural over the course of economic development,71 less attention
was given to the role of distribution as an independent variable in explaining economic growth. 
While it is reasonable to assume that very high levels of equality would yield an incentive
structure that could contribute to slower growth, high levels of inequality can also produce such
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dis-incentives.  Recent research supports the view that economic growth is positively associated
with relatively egalitarian distributions of income.72
In general, new classical issues serve as a reminder that security has both static and dyna-
mic components.  Static concerns, such as current force levels and postures are certainly impor-
tant.  But security is an inherently dynamic concept, and these dynamics rest on issues associated
with political economy.
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
In the contemporary international system, all three sets of issues concerning political
economy and national security will be of increasing importance.  Modern issues will be routinely
felt, as all states appear to be more and more like small states in their exposure to and size rela-
tive to the international economy.  Concerns for coercion, influence, dependence, and autonomy
will become routine, with the balance of these factors influenced by whether the international
economy develops regionally or globally.  The security implications of this evolution will be
profound, but less dramatic than the challenges that will be raised by manifestations of classical
and new classical issues in the short run.  Three areas of the globe stand out as flash points in
which political economy will shape the security structure and environment: China, Eastern
Europe, and the United States.
China, with its dramatic economic growth and large absolute size, represents a classic
example of the war-prone state according to equilibrium theories.  Such theories hold that just as
the external ambition of the United States, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union all increased
commensurate with their economic expansion, as surely as day follows night China will be
increasingly assertive in its quest for a place in the sun.  Writing in 1988, Kahler argued that
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international stability was likely to persist “until the elite of another ascendant power (China?)
discovers the means to reinforce its military ambitions with economic success.”73
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the East Asian region is also populated by
other states that are likely to have similar, if more modest expectations of playing a greater role
on the world stage.74 China, however, remains the central threat.  The only factor mitigating this
threat is the continuing decentralization and internationalization of the Chinese economy.
Decentralization creates new centers of power within China that may inhibit adventurism, and
internationalization, at least according to liberal theory, expands the possibility for bargaining
and creates incentives to maintain peace.  As a result, future Chinese behavior offers a test of
competing theories of international relations.75
While China’s growth is potentially destabilizing, the same is true of economic
stagnation and decline in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.  If China is analogous to
Germany before the First World War, then this region resembles Germany after that
conflict—where economic dislocation and despair contributed to the radicalization of politics
and ultimately to war.  Once again the peace—this time following the Cold War, has economic
consequences.  Keynes argued in 1919 that the post-war settlement “includes no provisions for
the economic rehabilitation of Europe—nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good
neighbors, nothing to stabilize the new states of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia.”76  The same
can be said for the “settlement” of the Cold War, which does not address the dramatic dislocative
effects of the collapse of the Soviet empire.  While there may be no obvious policy prescriptions,
it should be noted that retaining economic stability in this region is a security concern, and
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further, that the pattern of economic arrangements which does emerge will have fundamental
consequences for state power.
The United States faces a distinct challenge in the post-Cold War era.  Triumphant in the
Cold War and dominant militarily, the United States nonetheless faces grave threats with regard
to the economic sustainability of its security.  Victory has left the United States without a clear
sense of purpose on the international scene, while at the same time, indicators suggest increasing
social stresses.  Median family income has exhibited no real net growth over the past twenty
years, while income inequality has been increasing.  Investment in future growth—especially in
infrastructure and human capital—has not been sufficient.77  Such factors do not represent a pres-
ent military challenge, but carry with them a steady erosion of U.S. power.
In fact, the single greatest security threat to the United States in the early post-Cold War
era emanates from the internal atrophy of its national vitality.  Social economic problems left
unchecked will undermine economic growth and thus future power.  They will also increase dis-
tributional conflict, making it extremely difficult for the government to mobilize the resources
necessary to support far-sighted national goals.  This represents a great danger for the interna-
tional system as a whole, given the possibility that in the absence of a clear threat, these stresses
in the U.S. economy will manifest themselves in increasing isolationism.
Regardless of the resolution of these three salient issues, it should be clear that in order
to understand international relations in the post-Cold War era, it will be necessary to return to
business-as-usual, in which the subfields of political economy and security studies are fully
integrated.
